4 Key issues

Generally, the informants are veterans of consultation and have developed a mature response system that goes broad and deep. This can benefit all New Zealanders as the issues and solutions combine to address both rights and needs. Feedback from earlier drafts of this report suggests that the issues raised are of interest to other groups aside from Māori. Yet the warning is that the interests of "all New Zealanders" could submerge Māori interests. This report holds strong to the view that Māori interests must be visible and acted upon.

The "perceptions" of the issues may dissolve (or alternatively, intensify) with more information. EGU staff agree that they have a responsibility to ensure useful information and effective communication about the Online Authentication Project is important for achieving meaningful input by Māori.

The following issues are presented in an informal order of priority. This is based on the emphasis give to them by the informants in expressing their views, the frequency at which an issue was raised, and the experience of similar projects. These relative priorities are likely to alter at different points in the project.

4.1 Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti O Waitangi

Te Tiriti O Waitangi (1840) is our country's founding document [There is ongoing debate between the Crown and Māori regarding the recognition of the Māori version of the Treaty and its legal status in International law. This particularly refers to the rule of contra proferentum which is applied to bilingual treaties and dictates that in cases of ambiguity a treaty is to be interpreted against the party drafting it. See Te Puni Kōkiri, (2001a), Page 19.] . While debate is ongoing regarding its status and implementation, Government and Courts move towards recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi principles. The legal status of the Treaty [Treaty is used generically in this paper in reference to multiple perspectives and versions.] is not enforceable as there is an absence of statutory incorporation [See Te Puni Kōkiri, (2001a), Page 16.] .

Therefore, the proposition to establish a legislated Treaty-based governance-kaitiaki model is dependent on the application of moral obligations of the Crown.

This report recommends further discussion about the inclusion of authorising legislation regarding governance-kaitiaki. This is discussed in Section 6: Governance-Kaitiaki and is considered to be a feasible proposal given the parallel recommendations for authorising legislation in the Privacy Impact Assessment [See Pacific Privacy Consulting, (2003).] .

At the core of discussions with informants, is the challenge to the EGU to apply the Treaty "in practice". The Treaty, says one informant, gives Māori the right to "be and act" as Māori.

The Ōtaki hui notes show that in April 2002 and June 2003, Te Puni Kōkiri advised Cabinet that the authentication policy framework had no Treaty of Waitangi implications at that time. Later, the Ōtaki hui in November 2003 reiterated that this was a view that is no longer held to be true. It is noted that different people may have attended each of those hui. The issue of consistency and continuity of participants is raised in Section 4.3: Partnership, participation and consultation.

Informants want to prevent possible filtering of information by the EGU with regards to the project's relevance to the Treaty. The view that the Treaty "applies to everything" and "there are Treaty implications unless proven otherwise" points to the desire that any information can be examined by Māori.

Treaty issues were addressed recently by The Korowai Groups [See Paua Interface Ltd, Terry Smith & Associates (2002), Page 7.] - the group of mostly the same informants in this process were also involved in that 2002 consultation. The following information from that plan was produced in consultation with Korowai member groups and was not the subject of extensive consultation with Māori. The following is included as supplementary information:

The Treaty of Waitangi (1840) is a local and living model for Iwi/Māori and Crown partners and agencies to apply tino rangatiratanga [Tino Rangatiratanga implies a great degree of control and self-management.] . It acts as a framework by which we can measure the appropriateness of strategies for ICT for Māori.

In particular:

• Article II of the Treaty guarantees Māori control and enjoyment of their valued possessions - tangible and intangible. This includes their knowledge and information
• Article III of the Treaty affords Māori the attainment of equal human and social rights

These Treaty concepts, when integrated into the ICT strategy, will enable the government and Māori to:

• Protect Māori intellectual and cultural property by implementing Kaitiakitanga (eg. governance)
• Be consistent and coordinated when proposing, developing, implementing and evaluating ICT for Māori
• Support relevant ICT projects that adhere to Māori values
• Clarify ownership, access and use of information about Māori
• Build policies for collection, analysis, and publication of information about Māori

The strategy will also further the aspirations of Māori by supporting:

• A framework for cooperation, collaboration and negotiation between stakeholders.
• Genuinely informed buy in and uptake of ICT and this strategy by Māori stakeholders.
• Māori stakeholder ownership and management of ICT gains for Māori.
• Māori efforts to retain tino rangatiratanga over information about Māori including its identification, collection, use, access, analysis and publication.
• Māori stakeholders' active participation in the management of ICTs (eg. policy, privacy, ethics, ownership, development, implementation, evaluation, etc.)
• The responsible and productive use of statistical data on Māori.
• Working with Māori structures such as Iwi, hapu, whanau, urban Māori, pan-tribal and any organisations managed by and accountable to Māori and whanau.

From The Korowai Groups (3 May 2002), Māori Information & Communication Technologies Strategy, Project Plan

This could be a potential starting point for establishing a context for the objectives sought in incorporating Māori perspectives in the design and operations of the Online Authentication Project and E-Government more generally. This model would be one of a number of tasks and processes proposed for the establishment of governance-kaitiaki (Refer Section 6).

Key Points

• The Treaty is the starting point for the Online Authentication Project
• The Treaty underpins the establishment of a governance-kaitiaki body

4.2 Applicability to E-Government

Most informants consider that the scope and recommendations of this report apply to the wider E-Government projects and at a strategic level.

They consider it is a risk to develop solutions within the lower level project of online authentication and that it risks inconsistency with other E-Government projects.

There is a risk that the full value of the solutions developed in this project may be lost or even undermined by those developed in associated projects. Some informants have already experienced consultation that addresses identical issues.

At this time, the issues raised in this report were in relation to the Online Authentication Project and while some apply broadly, it cannot be assumed that the issues and solutions would be transferable to other projects.

Key Point

• The Online Authentication Project needs to be considered in the wider context of the E-Government Strategy

4.3 Partnership, participation and consultation

Informants say the Online Authentication Project may not attract great interest at this time as other more pressing issues are "all-consuming" [Seabed and foreshore debates and current race relation issues.] . However, they agree that the impact of the project and the wide E-Government strategy will be long-reaching. Therefore, it is important, they say, that Māori are involved in all aspects.

One informant goes on to say that Māori must have a role even if they have to "drag them in". Engagement must be accompanied by an education programme so that Māori can understand the issues. A particular effort must be made to use existing systems such as Māori radio, television, newspapers and magazines, and places such as Wananga.

"Don't dump lots onto people who are not receptive. It only has value if there is dialogue, and what dialogue can they expect from spewing stuff at people - no response is not a response"

Some say the Online Authentication Project is too narrow a subject to consult on and will not return the results. Consultation would be better served by re-scoping it to the E-Government level. The education of Māori then on this broader topic will be seen to be more relevant and purposeful.

Finally, there is a desire to normalise Māori involvement as a matter of course, rather than as an "add-on". Informants do not wish to be involved after decisions are made.

4.3.1 Partnership

Informants believe that participation (rather than consultation which is perceived as ineffective) enables influence over the project, and a higher degree of participation implies "partnership".

The call for a partnership between Māori and the EGU is raised consistently. Informants have a sense of needing to, and having a right to, be fully engaged with the project. Some say that 'partnership' is not so much an issue at the project level, but it is at the governance level. Others say that partnership is an issue at all levels from design to implementation to post-implementation.

In any case, informants include a qualifier to describe the relationship.

"Input should be on an equal footing and not servant/master relationship"

They reiterate that at no point should Māori feel like they are being marginalised.

"Are Māori a real part of this project or just a consequence?"

4.3.2 Participation and consultation

Informants believe that consulting with Māori should be as natural as any other consultation, and not an after-thought.

Some say that Māori havenot been consulted well on the project and that this is critical as online authentication will cause a major change in the way that Government agencies work with Māori. Some believe the project has forged ahead with little participation from Māori. Initial consultation by the EGU reveals capability issues relating to engagement and an understanding of Treaty issues. Informants would like a strategy of participation to be developed and agreed. Consequently, there is a desire by all informants that the EGU work closely with Māori.

The issue of continuity of participants needs to be managed due to the "steep learning curves" required for effective input. For example, one informant says that while hui are useful but are vulnerable when agendas can be shifted by new people who "just turn up".

Full and extensive consultation at all levels (i.e. operations, management and governance) throughout the design, implementation and post-implementation stages was preferred.

Further discussion is necessary but participation could include a representative of that partnership at the management level who is involved in various decision-making processes. The person would need the authority to be part of decisions, need to have their partnership role in their job description, and be required to report back to governance-kaitiaki, etc. A process to make it effective would need to be developed.

4.3.3 Māori women

In noting the genders of most of the informants, and the high possibility of low participation by Māori women, one informant called for Māori women's voices to be actively sought saying that they are more likely to consider the needs of whanau and tamariki first. For example, the establishment of Te Waka Wāhine Wā-Hangarau [Society of Professional Māori Women in Information Technology has around 40 informal members. The group is currently restructuring to formalise its membership and update its strategy.] in 2000 was a response to low participation of Māori women in technology-related fields and the lack of focus on whanau and tamariki.

Hamilton-Pearce's report [Hamilton-Pearce, J. (2002)] highlights issues of importance to Māori women that include infrastructure, education, cultural aspects and Māori women's issues. The report says that Māori women continue to be committed to the sustainability of whanau, hapu and Iwi, whether at home, in their organisations, communities, or Iwi groups. It says that any strategies that focus on the views of Māori women would benefit the collective groups they are committed to.

Key Points

• Māori need to be active partners and participants in the Online Authentication Project
• Māori participation needs to be all levels of the Online Authentication Project including governance and management
• Māori participation needs to be throughout the Online Authentication Project process from design, implementation, monitoring and review
• Māori women are vital to partnership and participation and need to specifically recognised in the Online Authentication Project structures and processes

4.4 Authorising legislation

The PIA makes the assumption that there will be a specific Act of Parliament providing for all the key ingredients for the authentication scheme [See Pacific Privacy Consulting, (2003), page 5, and Recommendation 25, page 7 (use and disclosure), Recommendation 30, page 7 (review body), and especially Recommendation 34, page 8 (ongoing independent monitoring and periodic independent review, clear consultation and public decision-making ...)] . It is noted that in the process of formulating such an Act, there is an opportunity to address non-legislated components of this report around concepts such as "collective privacy" (use and disclosure of statistical data), a governance-kaitiaki body, consultation and decision-making, etc.

Key Point

• Any authorising legislation for online authentication should take account of the Treaty and Māori specific interests and issues

4.5 Purpose and use

The purpose and use of the online authentication system is not clear and should be the subject of rigorous process and debate. Examples of scope creep and function creep are perceived to be common.

While some informants say we must know the purpose and use, others do not believe that even if that is clear and decisions made, that it is protected from covert scope/function creep.

Key Points

• There is concern about the purpose and use of online authentication
• The purpose and use of online authentication needs to be clarified and protected from "scope and function creep"

4.6 Statistical issues

It is not intended at this time that statistical data will be collected. However, some informants believe that even if such a decision is initially made, it would not be sustained over time.

"How can you protect this information from being used for statistical purposes - this can't be guaranteed"

Despite awareness amongst Māori of intellectual and cultural property issues worldwide, Government databases still store abundant data about Māori. The data is analysed and published and Māori are again subjected to statistical research findings that continue to reinforce the most negative stereotypes. The Online Authentication Project has the potential to symbolise an additional disadvantage for Māori, who are busy curbing further decline and whose experience of information technology that is controlled by others is that it repeats and reinforces perceptions of failure [Kamira, R. (2002)] .

Informants agree that statistical data could be generated but that it must be managed by governance-kaitiaki. For example, if the minimal data set [The 'Minimum data set' is Name, Date of birth, Location of birth, Gender (note ethnicity is not included at this time). There is the possibility of using a person's relationship with another authenticated whanau member, or whakapapa to authenticate the identity of a person - thus making a link.] is extended to include ethnicity, then this along with location data in some cases, would be an indicator of uptake of on-line services by Māori and could contribute to development. Collecting a limited and regular set of statistical data is useful when linked to guidelines, criteria and processes for gathering, analysing and publishing.

The Privacy Act (1993) is individually focused. Informants ask what the protective mechanisms for collective privacy are. The issue of "collective ownership" and "collective privacy" [See Appendix F: Glossary of terms] incorporates the idea of a whanau or hapu "owning" their collective information [Kamira, R. (2000c) and (2003)] also referred to as aggregated or statistical data. This enables their rights to make decisions about that information including how it is shared, how it is aggregated and how it is published. This concept is not supported in legislation and generally is not addressed in Privacy Impact Assessments. The "ownership" of aggregated data will generate further debate.

While the PIA for this project is a comprehensive analysis of the Privacy Act (1993) and wider privacy and concerns, it can be supported by further analysis provided in this report and we recommend they are considered together.

Key Points

• There is concern about the inappropriate use of online authentication aggregated and statistical data
• The use of aggregated and statistical data should be managed by a governance-kaitiaki body to ensure individual and collective privacy, and intellectual property rights are protected and used for purposes that benefit Māori
• There needs to be recognition of collective "ownership", use and management of aggregated and statistical data

4.7 Whakapapa information

While not part of the proposed business solution design [Refer to "Authentication for e-government: Business process design (version 1.0)" dated 15 November 2003] , the EGU is interested in what would be perceived to be whakapapa information.

As a precursor to the definition below, it should be recognised that whakapapa, is complex and many views exist about its treatment. These differ from Iwi to Iwi, and whanau to whanau. One definition is:

“Whakapapa is the genealogical descent of all living things from the gods to the present time. Whakapapa is the basis for the organisation of knowledge in respect of the creation and development of all things. It is through genealogy that kinship and economic ties are cemented and that the mana or power of a chief is inherited. Whakapapa is one of the most prized forms of knowledge and great efforts are made to preserve it. Whakapapa can be interpreted as the layering of generations upon one another, and through its recital (tatai) this is apparent.
(Summarised from Barlow) [Barlow, C., (1991), Tikanga Whakaaro: Key Concepts in Māori Culture, Oxford, Auckland.]

Some informants considered that a person’s name on its own constitutes whakapapa. This relates to its source - tupuna and history.

"The distinction between data, information and knowledge is different – for Māori a name is not data but information about a person."

"For Maori a name is important - not necessarily with who business is transacted, or the number of times. Whereas for Pakeha, it may be the other way around."

The informants were asked to consider the following:

The intended ‘Minimum data set’ for the ID credential for individuals is Name, Date of birth, Location of birth, Gender (Note, ethnicity is not included at this time). There is a possibility of using a person’s relationship with another authenticated whanau member, or whakapapa to authenticate the identity of a person – thus making a link.

One informant discussed methods of researching whakapapa. It included gathering a number of components on individuals and whanau including data (name, date of birth, location of birth, gender), photographs and stories. In discussing the Online Authentication Project the similarities are obvious.

Issues regarding whakapapa have been raised in similar projects such as the Māori Land Court’s Māori Land On Line project [Article dated Wednesday 18 February 2004 on http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/SC0402/S00064.htm, retrieved March 26 2004]. The Māori Land Court is currently seeking feedback on its proposals to give users the ability to look at Māori land blocks, search for current Māori land owners and check for block management information via a website. One informant observed that, "in previous hui held throughout the country Maori have said they do not want whakapapa available on the Internet."

The kidZnet project also questions the appropriateness of whakapapa on databases held by Government and identifies “collective ownership” and “collective privacy” as critical, and the establishment of governance-kaitiaki as a vehicle to manage it [Kamira, R. (2000a).

In these two cases, whakapapa is considered to be a “by-product” of the systems and not an explicit outcome.

The New Zealand Herald’s Adam Gifford claims that whakapapa on the Internet is an issue over which controversy rages on any marae in the country where it is mentioned [Article dated 17 October 2000 on http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?155590&thesection=technology&thesubsection=general, retreived 26 March 2004]. He writes that many Maori say whakapapa is sacred information, or intellectual property that should not be published for the public gaze. Alternatively, Ross Himona, who in the mid-1990s was one of the first Maori to establish an Internet presence, is unapologetic that his maaori.com site contains comprehensive lists of whakapapa.

Informants raise the following comments and questions:

• A parent could validate the authentication of his/her child, as presently occurs with Government processes. Where would this parental validation end? Could cousins and other whanau members be ‘authenticated’ in the same way? How would this information be linked?
• How will issues for whangai relationships be managed?
• How will the use of aliases or multiple names for one person be managed? For Maori this can be common practice but does not imply any intention of illegal activity.

Our analysis is that the issue is not so much that whakapapa information will be held by the Government as in its most simplest form it already has this information. The issue is control.

Key Points

• Online authentication data will contain whakapapa information and therefore its use needs to be managed
• How will the Online Authentication Project address whanaungatanga (relationships). For example, whangai and matua in the validation process

4.8 Sharing data between agencies

Informants had only a sense of the current sharing of data between Government agencies that already occurs. The Governments concept of ownership and information sharing needs clarification. Informants generally do not have a good grasp of the extent of the right of Government agencies to share information.

Key Points

• Authentication raises the issue of loss of control and ownership of data where it is shared between agencies, and it should not be shared without knowledge/consent
• Sharing must be known as part of the "opt-on" decision by Māori

4.9 Collective privacy

Informants who feel familiar with the Privacy Act (1993) tend to be comfortable with the expected adherence to standard confidentiality and privacy laws. However, as the PIA notes [See Pacific Privacy Consulting, (2003), Section 1.34 (page 17)] , the relatively low level of concern cannot be taken as a reliable indication that major privacy and security issues could not arise as the scheme progresses.

The report raises the issue of lack of understanding about legislation and its inability to protect some Māori interests raised here. The limitations of the Privacy Act (1993) are not well understood and the idea of "collective ownership" and therefore "collective privacy" is conceptual but not supported by legislation. Some informants emphasised that the Government will assume ownership of the data and therefore the right to make decisions about it.

While the PIA recommends the establishment of a Review body, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) is tasked with monitoring privacy aspects of Government service delivery, the issue for Māori will be their involvement and ability to extend the benefits of these roles regarding "collective privacy".

Collective ownership refers to information about groups such as Hapu and whanau, and information about those groups from whom the original data or information was sourced

Collective ownership implies the right to collective privacy of information about groups. The term enables Māori to determine how aggregated or statistical information is monitored, how it is collected, accessed, analysed, used and published.

Key Point

• Māori ownership and collective interests are not recognised by current privacy legislation

4.10 Security

Informants agree that Māori are more likely to be victims of abuse and crime. This leads them to ask for consideration of the vulnerability of certain groups such as Māori women.

The security aspects are raised in terms of personal security rather than technical security. They include:

• The plight of Māori women in abusive domestic situations
• Reducing the possibility of coercion and or crime related to the Online Authentication Project
• A combination of policies and technical support would reduce the personal risk associated with authentication services.

Key Points

• Personal security issues around coercion related to online authentication services needs to be addressed
• Māori women and children are more likely to be at risk regarding security and therefore mechanisms need to be put in place to reduce this risk

4.11 Biometrics

[Note: Comments in this section reflect the authors' views and were not explicitly raised by informants. Italicised text has been added by the author subsequent to the 29 March 2004 version provided to informants.]

"There are fourteen [name of person withheld]. Three have the same birth date. The only things that distinguish them are their hapu affiliations - how will this be addressed."

The issue raised by this informant, based on actual experience, relates to the possibility of duplication or identity fraud and the possible risks this could incur for both the project and individuals. The minimum dataset for the ID credential for individuals is Name, Date of birth, Location of birth and Gender. This attracts criticism regarding its ability to truly identify individuals uniquely. Biometrics is one emerging solution to this problem, which offers the potential to increase the safety of authentication. This has been raised in the PIA [See Pacific Privacy Consulting, (2003), Sections 3.64 to 3.70, and Recommendation 8.] and, whilst the appropriateness of digital photographs has been raised, the wider implications of biometrics will need to be discussed further.

The field of biometrics is relatively new, there is not yet a general awareness of it and, therefore, also a potential for an uniformed over-reaction. There has been no significant debate to extend the understanding amongst Māori (or the general public). Perhaps the most commonly cited example of biometrics is the move towards 'smart' passports that contain a microchip capable of holding biometric data.

Biometrics, simply stated, introduces the potential to record not only 'soft' information (such as name and date of birth) but also 'hard' information, based on physical attributes and characteristics (such as fingerprints and retina scans). Such 'hard' data is inherently unique and therefore makes impersonation and identity-fraud significantly harder to perpetrate.

Since this is a new concept, a detailed definition is included:

Biometrics is the science and technology of measuring and statistically analysing biological data. In information technology, it usually refers to technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics such as fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns, and hand measurements, especially for authentication purposes.

Biometric devices consist of a reader or scanner, software that converts the scanned information into digital form, and a database that stores the biometric data for comparison with previous records. When converting the biometric input, the software identifies specific points of data as match points. The match points are processed into a value that can be compared with biometric data scanned when a user tries to gain access. Fingerprint, facial, or other biometric data can be placed on a smart card and users can present both the smartcard and their fingerprints or faces to merchants, banks, or telephones for an extra degree of authentication.

IBM, Microsoft, Novell and others are developing a standard, called "BioAPI" that will allow different manufacturers' biometric software to interact. There are privacy concerns about the gathering and sharing of biometric data, however. One suggestion to allay privacy concerns is to encrypt biometric data when it's gathered and discard the original data to prevent identity theft [http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9_gci211666,00.html retrieved 24 March 2004] .

Though the use of biometrics in information technology is new, many believe it will play a critical role especially in electronic commerce. Personal computers of the future might include a fingerprint scanner where you could place your index finger. The computer would analyse your fingerprint to determine who you are and, based on your identity, authorise you different levels of access. Access levels could include the ability to use credit card information to make electronic purchases [ http://sbc.webopedia.com/TERM/B/biometrics.html] .

Biometrics is already in use by the Police, Department of Internal Affairs and other agencies. Some informants understand that it has been in common and accepted use for some time. Therefore, the key issue appears to be about control; how and for what purpose such information will be captured, stored and used.

Perception is an issue, for example the traditional use of fingerprints by the Police implies a criminal connection that could, at worst, alarm and disengage the public towards the idea of recording such information electronically. This and other such 'Big Brother' analogies will need to be taken seriously and addressed.

It is recommended that Māori join the debate on biometrics and become familiar with the term, its uses and its implications such that they are able to inform the adoption of this technology.

Key Points

• Further consideration needs to be give as to how duplication and fraud will be addressed in online authentication
• Biometrics is an emerging technology that could provide a model for affirmative identification and therefore a solution to online fraud
• The recording of a person's biological characteristics has significant cultural implications for Māori
• Further education and consultation is required in this area and Māori should participate in project discussions about biometrics

4.12 Access by groups

One informant states that online authentication is not based on Māori philosophies or values related to collectives such as Hapu and Iwi. Instead it supports individualism. That is, the proposal excludes groups and organisations. This is reiterated in the PIA [See Pacific Privacy Consulting, (2003), Sections 3.47 to 3.54 and Recommendation 4, page 43.] .

The interface is "one-to-many" (an individual that interacts with Government agencies) and therefore "this undermines our collective infrastructure and values".

Key Points

• Online authentication appears to supports only individualism
• How will the Online Authentication Project support Māori philosophies and values related to collectives such as Hapu and Whanau

4.13 Access

One informant says that Article Three of the Treaty relates to equity of services and so multiple forms of access may be necessary (i.e. Internet-only access will limit access by Māori). For example, current statistics show that relatively few Māori have access to the internet (25% of Māori households, according to the 2001 Census).

In the near future, the current means of access to services should not be downgraded or sacrificed for online services. One informant stresses that the initial expenses of installing new systems will create a pressure on Government agencies to shift more resources to online services. This will be to recoup their capital investment, possibly at the expense of actual offices and staff for face-to-face contact. This trend will disadvantage people who do not have Internet access - particularly low-income Māori. This may be an Article Two issue where online authentication undermines cultural and social structures rather than supports them.

Also, it is important to note that "non-adoption" is not the same as "no access". Some will choose not to use technology in favour of kanohi ki te kanohi (face to face).

Key Points

• Māori are likely to be disadvantaged as a result of extended online service
• Authentication may undermine Māori cultural and social structures
• Authentication may undermine Māori cultural preferences for face to face contact
• Online services should not downgrade current means of access but just provide another option

4.14 Trusted referees

One informant raises the point as to why only Government identification structures should be used to authenticate a person's on-line existence. Another says the current practice of verifying a person's identity (e.g. the use of a Justice of the Peace or another Government agency) undermines whanaungatanga confirmation/verification processes and therefore impacts the social cultural fabric of Māori society.

The identification processes used by Māori include verifying whakapapa through a process of whanaungatanga. This often entails a face to face encounter that upon sharing knowledge of people, places and events, a link between genealogies is made thus verifying the whakapapa of the person. It is not unlike an oral examination.

The process would include roles such as Kaumatua and other respected holders of whakapapa knowledge. It is worthy to note, say some informants, that in many whanau, whakapapa knowledge is held by members of the whanau or Hapu that are not necessarily categorised as "Kaumatua". For example, some informants referred cousins, siblings or themselves as the holders of whakapapa on behalf of their whanau or hapu.

Informants ask to have a say regarding what criteria would enable the inclusion of "trusted" organisations and people such as kaumatua, hapu, iwi and other Māori organisations.

Key Points

• "Normal" trusted referee policies and practices go against or are not supportive of Māori social and cultural values, process and practices
• Trusted referee policies and practices should incorporate whanaungatanga and whakapapa

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